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Abstract
This paper reviews recent literature on joint liability lending in micro-
credit markets characterized by adverse selection. This mode of lending
consists of granting individual loans to wealthless borrowers provided
that they form groups: if a group does not fully repay its obligations,
then the microlender cut off all members from future credit until the
debt is repaid. Joint liability lending is able to extract information
through a peer selection mechanism, with the effect of raising both re-
payment rates and welfare with respect to individual lending.
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1 Introduction
The term microcredit denotes the activity of financial organizations that em-
ploy nonconventional methods to lend to poor.
The pioneering microfinancial institution was Grameen Bank, founded in
1976 byMuhammad Yunus and located in Bangladesh. The idea of microcredit
has now spread globally, with replications in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and
Eastern Europe, as well as in richer economies like Norway, the United States,
France and England. Empirical evidence shows that these unconventional
lenders have a reasonable degree of financial self-sufficiency and repayment
rates even if they target poor people whom no ordinary commercial bank would
want as customers because of their lack of assets to be put up as collateral.
One of the reasons for this success, especially in the rural underdeveloped
economies, is the application of joint liability: this scheme of lending captured
the interest of researchers since it mitigates informational problems in credit
markets without requesting any pecuniary collateral.
The current survey focuses on joint liability as an instrument to improve
discrimination among borrowers of different types and is based on Ghatak
(1999), Morduch (1999), Ghatak and Guinnane (1999), Ghatak (2000), Gan-
gopadhyay and Lensink (2001) and Gangopadhyay et al. (2001).
Joint liability lending works as follows: borrowers, who work on indepen-
dent projects, self-select into groups to get the loan. If the group does not
fully repay its obligations, then the microlender cut off all members from fu-
ture credit until the debt is repaid. Joint liability induces borrowers, who have
perfect information about the type of each other for they belong to small rural
communities, to choose partners of the same type: this is called peer selection.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A model of individual
lending with no collateral is laid out in Section 2. We consider a microcredit
market characterized by adverse selection à la Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Two
types of wealthless borrowers, risky and safe, are present: risky ones repay with
lower probability but their returns are higher in the case of success. Projects
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of both types of borrowers are assumed to be socially profitable; yet, only
risky ones do receive funding when lending is individual because their presence
drives the break-even interest rate of the microlender too high: the market
displays underinvestment. Section 3 shows that when joint liability lending
is implemented the microcredit institution is able to separate risky borrowers
from safe even if the latter ends up with lower profits. As a consequence, both
repayment rate and welfare, defined as the sum of expected values of projects,
increase with respect to individual lending because safe borrowers do apply for
the loan. Section 4 contains concluding remarks.
2 Individual Lending
Consider a rural community in which there are two types of wealthless bor-
rowers. Borrowers of type r propose projects which yield Ar with probability
pr and zero otherwise. Projects of type s borrowers yield A
s with probability
ps and zero otherwise. Let 1 > ps > pr > 0 and prA
r = psA
s = A: the type
r project is riskier but in the case of success is more remunerative; moreover,
the projects have the same expected value. Type r borrowers are called risky
and type s ones are called safe. Each borrower needs one unit of capital to
implement the project and applies for a loan. There is a single microcredit
institution which knows the fraction 0 < λ < 1 of risky borrowers and the
fraction 1 − λ of safe borrowers in the population, but ignores which specific
borrower is of which type. Borrowers, though, have perfect information about
each other. The opportunity cost of labor is equal to u¯, while ρ > 1 is the op-
portunity unit cost of capital. The two values represent the reservation utility
of borrowers and microlender, respectively.
Assumption 1 max
{
2ps
pr(2−pr)
ρ,
ps(2−ps)
pr(2−pr)
ρ+ u¯
}
≤ A < ps
p¯
ρ+ u¯,
where p¯ = λpr + (1 − λ)ps is the average expected probability of repayment.
Assumption 1 implies that projects of both types of borrowers are socially
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profitable.1
The microlender proposes a contract in which the following limited liability
constraint is specified for the borrowers: when the project succeeds they have to
repay an amount that cannot exceed the realized returns, 0 < Ri ≤ Ai, where
i = r, s, while if returns are zero nothing is repaid. With no loss of generality
the optimal contracting problem is posed as follows. The microlender chooses
Ri such that his unitary expected profits are zero because he represents a not-
for-profit organization, provided that the incentive compatibility and limited
liability constraints of the borrowers are satisfied:
λprRr + (1− λ)psRs = ρ (1)
s.t.
A− prR
r ≥ A− prR
s, (ICr)
A− psR
s ≥ A− psR
r, (ICs)
Ri ≤ Ai,
where ICr(s) is the incentive compatibility constraint of type r (s). Solution
to (1) is R = Rr = Rs = ρ
p
, where p¯, defined above, is the average expected
probability of repayment. Risky borrowers end up with A − pr
p¯
ρ and safe
borrowers with A − ps
p¯
ρ. Safe borrowers have lower expected profits because
they repay the same amount ρ
p¯
with higher probability. Under Assumption
1 A − ps
p¯
ρ is lower than u, hence safe borrowers do not participate. The
microlender anticipates that if R is set equal to ρ
p¯
only risky borrowers will
apply for the loan. This represents the adverse selection effect and the new
contracting problem takes thus the following features:


prR = ρ,
R ≤ Ar.
(2)
The solution to (2) is R = ρ
pr
. At equilibrium the repayment rate is pr,
risky borrowers end up with A − ρ while equilibrium profit of safe borrowers
1See the Appendix for remarks.
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is u¯. Welfare, defined as the sum of expected values of projects, amounts to
λA+ (1− λ) (ρ+ u¯). We sum up these findings in the following
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, only risky borrowers apply for the loan
if individual lending is implemented: repayment rate is pr and welfare is λA+
(1− λ) (ρ+ u¯).
The economy is characterized by underinvestment because socially prof-
itable projects of safe borrowers do not receive funding.
3 Joint liability lending
In this section we introduce group lending with joint liability. Borrowers are
asked to form groups in which each member implements his own project and
project returns are statistically independent. Joint liability is modeled in the
following way: members as a whole, if successful, have to pay an additional
amount equal to c > 0 for any default of a partner.
3.1 Peer Selection
We first show that group formation exhibits peer selection. Consider for sim-
plicity groups of two members. When a borrower succeeds and the partner fails,
the former is charged the sum of individual and joint liability payments. Again
the financial agreement specifies a limited liability constraint: the amount to
be repaid cannot exceed the value of the successful return, Ri + ci ≤ Ai. If
a contract {R, c} is accepted, expected profit of a borrower i when partner is
risky or safe, respectively, is equal to
A− pi [R+ (1− pr)c] , (3)
A− pi [R+ (1− ps)c] . (4)
Given that ps > pr, type s is preferred when liability is joint for she reduces the
probability of paying c. It follows that safe borrowers will form groups among
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them, while risky borrowers will try to attract preferred safe borrowers. If
risky borrowers are allowed to make transfers to a safe one to have her as a
partner, such a transfer must at least equalize loss of a safe borrower from
having a risky partner:2
ps (ps − pr) c, (5)
where (ps − pr) is the increased probability of paying c. On the contrary, gain
of a risky borrower from having a safe partner amounts to
pr (ps − pr) c, (6)
where (ps − pr) is the reduced probability of paying c. Given that (5) is higher
than (6), risky borrowers cannot compensate safe ones with a side transfer
to have them as partners and simultaneously end up with a positive return:
groups arise with either all risky or safe borrowers. The intuition is as follows:
safe borrowers value safe mates more than risky borrowers because they repay
with higher probability, thereby being more likely to realize gains of having a
safe mate.
3.2 Zero-Profit Condition for the Microlender
We verify that the size of joint liability of safe borrowers cs is greater than the
extent of their individual liability Rs when optimal separating joint liability
contracts are, with no loss of generality, restricted to the offer of the pair
{Rr, cr} and {Rs, cs} such that unitary expected profits of the microlender
are zero and incentive compatibility constraints of both type of borrowers are
satisfied. Recall that expected profit of risky borrowers isA−pr [R+ (1− pr)c],
while safe ones get A− ps [R+ (1− ps)c]. In symbols
pr (R
r + (1− pr) c
r) = ρ, (7)
ps (R
s + (1− ps) c
s) = ρ (8)
s.t
2Since borrowers are wealthless such transfers cannot be interpreted in strictly monetary
terms. They rather consist, for example, of providing free labor services.
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Rr + (1− pr)c
r ≤ Rs + (1− pr) c
s, (IC ′r)
Rs + (1− ps)c
s ≤ Rr + (1− ps) c
r. (IC ′s)
By substituting the values of Rr and Rs derived by (7) and (8), respectively,
into (IC ′r) and (IC ′s), respectively, it is possible to conclude that the pair of
contracts {Rr, cr} and {Rs, cs} which satisfies both the zero-profit conditions
of the microlender and the IC constraints of the borrowers is such that

cr ≤ ρ
prps
≤ cs,
Rs ≤ ρ
prps
(pr + ps − 1) ≤ R
r.
(9)
The peer selection property allows the microlender to screen borrowers
‘by the company they keep’ because risky borrowers are less willing than safe
borrowers to accept an increase in the extent of joint liability.
Yet, it is worth noting that solution (9) prescribes cs > Rs. Therefore,
when a safe borrower succeeds and the other fails, the former has to pay her
own Rs plus the joint liability cost cs. Given that Rs + cs > 2Rs, it is then
in her interest to transfer an amount Rs to the failed partner who can repay
her obligations and pretend to have been successful. If the microlender offered
such a contract he would not break even. Furthermore, solution (9) does not
ensure that the limited liability constraints are satisfied.
3.3 Ex Post Truth-Telling Constraint
The analysis proceeds by studying what happens to optimal separating joint
liability contracts when we impose the additional condition
ci ≤ Ri, (10)
which we refer to as the ex post truth-telling constraint.
Since the violation of (10) derives by condition (8), we relax the latter so
that the microlender makes positive profits out of safe borrowers. The new
contracting problem is defined as follows: the microlender chooses Rs and cs
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to minimize his own profits on contract {Rs, cs} subject to conditions (IC ′r),
(IC ′s), (7), (10) and the limited liability constraints. In symbols
min
Rs,cs
ps [R
s + (1− ps) c
s] (11)
s.t.
Rr + (1− pr)c
r ≤ Rs + (1− pr) c
s,
Rs + (1− ps)c
s ≤ Rr + (1− ps) c
r,
pr (R
r + (1− pr) c
r) = ρ,
ci ≤ Ri,
Ri + ci ≤ Ai.
Solution to problem (11) is3


c′s = R′s = ρ
pr(2−pr)
,
c′r ≤ ρ
pr(2−pr)
, R′r ≥ ρ
pr(2−pr)
.
(12)
At equilibrium safe borrowers are given { ρ
pr(2−pr)
, ρ
pr(2−pr)
} and en up with
A− ps(2−ps)
pr(2−pr)
ρ; risky ones end up with A− ρ. Solution (12) suggests that joint
liability of borrowers may actually consist of repaying the debt of the partner
who fails, otherwise they are denied access to future credit.4
Assumption 1 ensures that participation constraints of all borrowers are
satisfied, hence both risky and safe ones participate in the microcredit program.
At equilibrium, repayment rate rises to p¯ and welfare to A. These findings are
summarized in the following
3See the Appendix for calculations. Note that min cs − c′s, where min cs = ρ
prps
is
the minimum amount of cs in solution (9), is positive and that R′s − maxRs, where
maxRs = ρ
prps
(pr + ps − 1) is the maximum amount of R
s in solution (9), is higher than
(1− ps) (min c
s − c′s): solution (12) prescribes lower joint liability and higher repayment for
safe borrowers with respect to solution (9) and it also satisfies the ‘peer selection property’,
i.e. (5)− (6) > 0, given that c′s ≥ cr.
4To see this, assume that a successful safe borrower who does not pay cs bears an oppor-
tunity cost equal to FB, where FB represents the discounted benefit of a continued lending
relationship. If FB > cs, then the borrower indeed repays when successful.
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Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1, joint liability lending raises repayment
rates and welfare with respect to individual liability lending for also safe bor-
rowers apply for the loan.
A traditional separating contract with individual liability plus collateral,
i.e. a contract for which c is paid in the case of failure of the borrower, is not
implementable because borrowers are poor and have no money when they fail.
With joint liability, though, c is paid by partners in the case of (their) success.
This overcomes the problem of the absence of collateral; furthermore, peer
selection enables the microlender to separate riskier clients from safer with the
effect of increase repayment rate and welfare.
4 Conclusion
This survey reviews literature on joint liability lending as an instrument to
improve discrimination among poor borrowers of different riskiness.
The standard method for separating good risks from bad risks is to ask
borrowers to put up collateral. Risky borrowers are likely to fail more often
and lose their collateral. If the microlender offers two different contracts, one
with high interest rates and low collateral and the other with the opposite,
risky borrowers select the former and safe borrowers the latter. But poor
people by definition do not have collateral, meaning that microlenders have to
seek alternative ways to separate good risks from bad.
The current survey shows that if joint liability contracts are offered, ‘ex
post guarantees’ are pledged by partners in the case of their success, thereby
overcoming the problem of the lack of collateral: thanks to peer selection
mechanism, safe borrowers will select the contract with higher joint liability
and lower interest rates, while risky borrowers the one with lower joint liability
and higher interest rate. As a consequence, the repayment rate and welfare rise
under joint liability contracts with respect to conventional individual liability
contracts because the former is able to exploit the information borrowers have
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about each other.
5 Appendix
(Remarks on Assumption 1). When max
{
2ps
pr(2−pr)
ρ,
ps(2−ps)
pr(2−pr)
ρ+ u¯
}
=
ps(2−ps)
pr(2−pr)
ρ+ u¯, i.e.
u¯ >
p2s
pr (2− pr)
ρ, (13)
the interval defined in Assumption 1 is nonempty if the following condition
holds
p¯ <
2− pr
2− ps
pr. (14)
Note that pr <
2−pr
2−ps
pr < ps. Contrarily, when max
{
2ps
pr(2−pr)
ρ,
ps(2−ps)
pr(2−pr)
ρ+ u¯
}
=
2ps
pr(2−pr)
ρ, i.e.
u¯ <
p2s
pr (2− pr)
ρ, (15)
the interval is nonempty for
p¯ <
prps (2− pr) ρ
2psρ− pr (2− pr) u¯
. (16)
Notice that pr <
prps(2−pr)ρ
2psρ−pr(2−pr)u¯
if and only if
ps
2− pr
ρ < u¯ <
p2s
pr (2− pr)
ρ. (17)
(Optimal separating joint liability contracts when cs ≤ Rs). We solve
condition (7) by cr to get
cr =
ρ− prR
r
pr (1− pr)
. (18)
We then substitute (18) into (IC ′r) and we solve it by cs. We get
cs ≥
ρ− prR
s
pr (1− pr)
. (19)
The objective function of the problem is increasing in Rs and cs, hence the
microlender sets them as low as possible in equilibrium. It follows that cs is
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chosen equal to ρ−prR
s
pr(1−pr)
for any given Rs. If we substitute cs = ρ−prR
s
pr(1−pr)
into
the objective function, the problem becomes as follows:
min
Rs
ps
pr (ps − pr)R
s + (1− ps) ρ
pr (1− pr)
(20)
s.t.
Rs + (1− ps)c
s ≤ Rr + (1− ps) c
r,
ci ≤ Ri,
ci +Ri ≤ Ai.
The function to be minimized is increasing in Rs, hence the microlender sets
it as low as possible in equilibrium, by taking into account the ex post truth-
telling constraint of safe borrowers. We get Rs = cs = ρ−prR
s
pr(1−pr)
and, solving by
Rs,
Rs = cs =
ρ
pr (2− pr)
. (21)
This solution is incentive compatible for safe borrowers if and only if
ρ
pr (2− pr)
+ (1− ps)
ρ
pr (2− pr)
≤ Rr + (1− ps)
ρ− prR
r
pr (1− pr)
. (22)
Solving by Rr, one gets
Rr ≥
ρ
pr (2− pr)
. (23)
Substituting this interval in (18) and solving by cr, one gets
cr ≤
ρ
pr (2− pr)
. (24)
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